By William Smith
The recent agreement between the Single Forces led by Kurdas (SDF) and the new government in Damascus has been acclaimed as a historical turning point for the Kurda minority of Syria, recognizing them as an ‘Rattyt indigenous community. Even more significantly, when asking for national fire and a merger or SDF and state institutions, the agreement suggests a possible resolution of the most intractable problems of the Syrian conflict: the future of the northeast controlled by SDF. However, as others have pointed out, the wise of the agreement is vague, as well as the mechanism proposed for the implementation of IT. Obviously, it seems that there is no agreement on how to integrate the military team of the Rebel Group, a frequent challenge faced by the peace agents and one that leads to their collapse.
The gap in the understanding between the SDF and Damascus was established in a recent debate on the exit of the professional government Syrian TV. “The devil is in the details,” said Faiz Al-Aasmar, a former Syrian army colonel who, who warned that “as negotiations progress between the two parties, many problems will arise to the surface.” The head of the thesis, suggested Al-Amargar, is the question of the SDF fighters that will be integrated into the Syrian Armed Forces individually or institutionally. “There can be no army within an army,” he argued, echoing the position of the new Syrian government headed by Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Dissolve and disassemble the SDF is also a central demand from Turkey, a key sponsor or damask, Becare or links between the dominant faction of the group, the people’s protection units (YPG) and the Kurdistan workers party.
The SDF seems to have other ideas. “The term” integration “can be interpreted in several different ways; it looks different depending on the angle of the one who sees it,” said Aldar Khalil, one of the key architects of the governance system backed by SDF, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AAN). The vision of the Earth is that the agreement makes the companions “with everything”, in the words of Salih Muslim’s words, in the hygura of the Landheats, is that the agreement remembers everything “with Damascus, in the words of Salih Muslim’s words. The YPG’s political wing.
These maximalist interpretations could be ruled out as a mere rhetoric: a high opening position in the ball before a set of working groups meet to crush the precise details of the agreement on the coming months. But the insistence of the SDF to retain its weapons reflects a frequent concern of the rebel groups involved in negotiations with government opponents. By accepting to disassemble and demobilize, how can they be sure that their opponents gained susceptions subset under the terms of the agreement? In the absence of a third -party guarantor, a more powerful adversary cannot offer a credible commitment, it will simply do not destroy an agreement and will once again resort to violence, a fact that has been described by the Politienteola Barbara Walter as the greatest obstacle to negotiating a peaceful resolution or civil wars.
Despite receiving significant support from the United States and others in the fight against the Islamic State, the SDF has realized that it can never really trust its western partners for the long -term protection of its adversaries, partly Turkey. Paradoxically, as the perspective of a withdrawal of the American troops of Syria further even more its negotiation position, the SDF is encouraged to quickly stay at a maximum position. ‘We will administer the State together […] We will direct the borders and share the income, “said Salih Muslim, insisting that” there will be no disarmament. “
The perspectives to ensure a lasting agreement will be better if problems at stake were limited to improving cultural rights for the Kurdish minority of Syria. Even here, however, Damascus’s recent signals have been less than reassuring. The temporary constitution announced in March defines Syria as an ‘Arab’ republic with the only official language of the country, a measure that led the SDF to warn Al-Sharaa against the repetition of the errors of the Assadia, and the pro-dat ‘stove and the pro-Dat’ mentality still and the tat ‘pro-dat’ and the pro-dat ‘and the pro-dat’ to pro-dat ‘and the mentality Pro-Dat ‘. Discussions such as Syrian TV It is unlikely to cancel such fears. The retired colonel Faiz Al-Amarh suggested that the Kurds should only be recruited in the Syrian army on a share of quota that reflects the demographic inferiority of the community, while one of his companions panelists repeated a claim spread by the old regime that the Syrian Kurds denied the citizenship in fact, in fact, immigrants from the neighboring countries.
But SDF demands go far beyond cultural rights. The group has requested a form of political decentralization that allows them to preserve its governance project. The AAES is based on the concept of the PKK ABDULLAH OCALAN PKK of ‘Democratic Confederalism’, a radical vision of democracy without a state (although in fact the presence of a network or ‘advisors’ of PKK’ (Kadros) It has made this more a system from top to bottom than an ascending system). But either in terms of theory or reality, the SDF project is barely compatible with the highly centralized model inspired by the Islamists practiced by Al-Sharaa in northern Syria during the best part of a decade and now consecrated.
It remains to be seen if the pragmatic ones in the SDF movement will finally erase their political aspirations in exchange for promises of better cultural rights for the Kurds, since many, including the United States Army, urges them to do. What SAT seems clear, however, both from previous rounds of intra-sirias conversations and experience elsewhere, is that when trying to escape the problem of commitment and preserve the coercive apparatus of the SDF, the probabilities will be firmly.
