By Eiman Mohamed
At the beginning of February 2024, ten months in the conflict in Sudan between SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) and RSF (Fast Support Forces), Internet services provided by the three main telecommunications providers in the country: Sudani -Zain, and Sudani, and Sudani. In the following days, the CEO of Zain Sudan declared that the RSF orchestrated the blackout by cutting the supply of electricity to the data centers within their controlled areas. From now on, the main states under the control of RSF, such as Darfurs and Jardum parts, remain out of line, while in the ‘safe states’ controlled by the SAF, telecommunications suppliers have successfully restored Internet services.
Sudan internet words: a tool or oppression of a decade
Long before the beginning of the current conflict, Internet closures had become a family weapon in the hands of those in power. For more than a decade, cutting digital communication has an advantage strategy to control the narrative and limit the ability of the population to mobilize. The first large blackout recorded on the Internet in Sudan dates back to 2013, the duration of the Omar Al-Bashir rule and in the midst of the protests of the Arab spring, when the government closed access as an answer to the protests in Jardum. Fast advance until 2018, mass protests against Al-Bashir, the Government touched a slightly different approach by selectively blocking access to social media platforms, forcing citizens to trust VPN to reach these websites.
After the fall of Al-Bashir, and under General Al-Burhan, the Internet blackouts became even more frequent, with almost 16 paths verified in accordance with the reports. Every time Sudan faced political agitation, whether mass protests or community violence, the government resorted to this method to control the information flow. In addition, beyond politics, Internet closures in Sudan have also applied national high school exams, supposedly to avoid traps. The most recent incident occurred in December 2024, more than 20 months after the current conflict, suggests that the authorities do not intend to abandon this strategy in the short term.
To Internet closures as a weapon of war
This time, the difference lies in the actors that perpetrate the turned off. Previously, Internet interruptions were mainly a tactic used by the Sudanese government to suppress dissent. Now, both the SAF and the RSF are using stops to control the flow of information within the territories held by the opposite side. The reports suggest that the closure of February 2024 was initiated by the RSF in reprisals for the interruptions of the Internet in Darfur, a region where the RSF has a significant political influence, an accusation that both SAF companies and telecommunications deny the telecommunications. Regardless of the specific motivations, the catastrophic implications of these Internet closures for the Sudanese population remain undeniable.
Tagged as one of the world’s humanitarian crisis, Sudan has seen more than 11 million people displaced internally, with famine declared in some parts of the country. Internet closures have exacerbated this crisis, blocking access to critical financial services such as Bankak, the most used electronic banking application in Sudan. Bankak has become a lifeguard for many Sudanese citizens due to the shortage of cash driven by the conflict and the growing dependence on family remittances abroad. This duration of the interruption, an economic crisis directly undermines the right to life, preventing people from accessing the necessary funds for survival, such as those necessary to buy food and medicines. In addition, social networks have become a crucial tool for those trapped in areas of heavy combat operations and seeking to escape. Reports indicate that many Sudanese citizens depend largely on these platforms to identify the safer routes to reach safe areas.
Starlink Under Siege: A line of life became a gun in the Sudan conflict
Alternatively, as a result of the continuous internet closure, the dependence on satellite communication, given by Starlink by the technological giant, Spacex has increased in RSF controlled areas. According to reports, RSF members sell Internet access to civilians, and Althegh Starlink devices allowed the continuation of the Internet service very necessary for citizens and help groups in this serious situation, their use raised great Conerns.
First, the purchase of an hour of Internet connection through Starlink costs approximately to £ 4.76 in some states, a substantial expense that financially benefits RSF members, but diverts the funds already escape from essential needs, particularly in a country with hyperinflation and the prices of basic goods. Second, citizens must access the service near the militant control points, putting their lives at risk of SAF air attacks or arbitrary telephone searches that could lead to capture, torture or kidnapping in exchange for feates, creating citizens of their dignity. Third, the use of Starlink satellite services, which remain little regulated locally, has a more sinister purpose, since it has been used to control the drones by the RSF that does not have bones used for the shell areas.
More recently, after a series of SAF victories in Jardum, the RSF supposedly begged to confiscate and burn Starlink devices, to the supposedly separated communication channels that could expose their retirement, broken down into the localities. This act underlines the worrying pattern of the systematic weapon that the RSF uses to serve its interests, either gaining its access, exploiting it for military gains or eliminating it completely when it no longer serves its him.
The practice of internet closure is deeply integrated into the Sudan approach to the Internet government. With approximately 11 years of experience, the government has adapted and armed closures as a control tool. However, the ongoing conflict has introduced new players who have adopted the same repressive tactics of the old play book, further catching Sudanese civilians between the hammer of staying online in dangerous conditions and isolation and anvil. And with the war in Sudan apparently decreasing, the question remains the internet closures persist as a long -term control strategy?
This piece It is part of a series that addresses the conflict, as well as other subjects related to Suran, such as employment, forced displacement, gender, humanitarian needs, migration and political participation.
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