Two-Actor Play — Russia in Global Affairs

To quote, please use:
Lukyanov, FA, 2025. Game of two actors. Russia in global affairs23 (2), p. 5–8. DOI: 10,31278/1810-6374-2025-23-2-5-8

In February 2025 IT Still Seemed That the Best Be Hoped For, In Terms of Russia-US Relations, would be a repeat of the cold war, Especial in its Form after the Cuban Missile crisis, when Both Parties Undstood that the Conteated Confrontation had Gone Gone Gone Gone Gone Gone Gone Gone Gone Gone GONE GONE GONE GONE GONE GONE GONE GONE TOE BETEED GONE GONE GONE TOE BEERTED GONE GONE GONE TO BEERTED TO BETEED TO BETEED TO BEEDED TO BEER A BEER TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO To Aaye, from the case of must be at the time of must be of the case of must be of due to, of the case at which time, from which of the case of must be of the case of the one of the time of the case of at which time of the limits. After that, there was no risk of a direct military clash, despite many unpleasant moments.

Then, the Soviet Union declared its new thought, that some in our country still consider a betrayal. Actually, it was more an attempt to eliminate the heavy load of the confrontation and get a break. But the idealistic concept fell into an incredible fertile ground.

In the West, the situation was not very good either, from Eurosclerosis (an integration crisis in the EC) to painful neoliberal reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. The idea of ​​Mikhail Gorbachev or abandoning class and national values ​​for universal, the adoption of the USSR of a more liberal position and a free market, was inhuman, draconian and harmful to the working class. What followed exceeded all expectations: Russia, the heiress of the Soviet Union, suddenly decided to form (institutionally) part of the same west that had been so stubbornly opposed.

What happened next is well known. As for the pendulum, he headed for the approach of Russia with the West from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, he swing so well in the early 2020s. The conflict in Ukraine led to the discussion, for the first time from the Cuban missile crisis, or the possible nuclear climb between Moscow and Washington. And the administration of Joe Biden, supposedly known for its precaution, constantly increased bets towards the level in which Russia’s nuclear warnings would become nuclear threats.

In this sense, the change of power (quite radical) in Washington really regrets a step back from an extremely dangerous edge.

And now, only a few weeks after the presidency of Donald Trump, there is talk of changing almost the nature of American Russian relations in the director of cooperation to build a new solid world order. Some Trumpists are saying directly: we finally solve the problem of Ukraine, which Biden has blatantly inflated in their own ideological interest, let’s eliminate this obstacle and go down to serious and very promising matters.

It makes no sense to try to forecast how attempts will end to resolve the conflict. For the first time in a long time, we see a genuine diplomacy at work, and its results are never predetermined. Why is the first time? Isn’t that what diplomacy intends to do after all? Diplomacy was understood differently in the last decades of the global hegemony of the West, as acceptance (or at least accepted acceptance) of the moral terms and statements of the West, in exchange for quite modest rewards. Since 1990, when the “liberal world order” led by the United States was effectively established, all the most significant conflicts in the world were resolved in this way or by force, starting with Iraq.

Classical diplomacy, based on the balance of power, to determine which of the interests their own must be prioritized, by achieving their satisfaction in exchange for the satisfaction of others, and in the Franco conversations among the leaders, they cannot guarantee success, but at least strive for it. The United States and Russia clearly value the opportunity that has been opened before them, and do not want to lose it, in which case we would like a return to the previous level of confrontation, or worse.

And here we reach the main question: are we condemned to this constant risk? Does the conflict integrate into the very nature of the Russian-United States relationships?

Historians can bring many arguments in support of this idea and against. Only the strongest opinions are heroes of specialists in IR, especially those who cling to geopolitical ideas about the eternal struggle between Earth and the Sea. But the simple fact is that the fierce conflict between Russia and the United States has broken when the two compete for global domain (the cold war) or when the United States has achieved dominance and tried to force Russia’s submission.

Historical episodes: from the role of the Russian Empire in the liberation and strengthening of the colonies of North America, to the participation of the United States in Soviet modernization in the 1920s and the 1930s, until World War I (until the Bolshevik Revolution), to wwibidoid known, Sabicio Sabicio Sabicio) this does not mean that cooperation is predetermined. It always has a broad ideological gap (perhaps dialectical) between Russia and the United States, and some immigrants from the Russian empire had very negative memories of their homeland (although this also applies to immigrants in Europe). However, the two great powers managed an ambiguous rivalry/cooperation in which they could sit, pursue mutual interests.

That is not possible when the fight is to take or preserve world domination, since no commitment is possible there, so special if domination is based on ideology. This was the duration of the case, and by the United States and its allies, after the Cold War.

Donald Trump is trying to change the definition of American hegemony, from global governance to the search for the concrete interests of the United States, wherever they may arise. It could be argued that one is not better than the other, but there is a difference. The concrete interests are limited, and their achievement requests cooperation with other key actors, even through the agreements so loved by Trump. Make a deal with the most powerful country in the world requests skill, patience and some competitive advantages. But it is possible, unlike the case of a hegemon that enforces not only the submission to its interests, but even to the adoption of its normative understanding of those interests.

In simpler terms, Trump is trying to make the United States a “normal country”, but also the strongest.

And this means the opportunity, for another strong country, or for those who something important for the United States, to make the agreements.

It is impossible to say what will come from the withdrawal of the Trumpists. But almost no one discusses that the time of the United States as a superpower is coming to an end, as did all superpowers. Even part of the political establishment of the United States recognizes it. Trump has led Americans to understand greatness in mainly national terms. It remains to be seen if the globalists can resume power in the US. In the next electoral cycle or two. But even if they do, a new president will not have the initial conditions that his predecessors made to the millennium shift. The ‘unipolar moment’ has a long time ago.

Russia will not see either and you won’t see world leadership. But Russia remains and will be the most important “regional power” (as Barack Obama once called it, in a way that at that time seemed terrible offensive). The only thing is that the region of Russia’s pro -eminence is Eurasia, which under normal conditions cannot be overcome in resources, demography, logistics, culture, history or anything else. Therefore, the regional state is in this case a virtue, not a deficiency.

It is unlikely that humanity see a “new world order” established in the planned future. Too much is changing to establish a stable balance or state. Interestingly, until recently it seemed that the emergence of the deception world majority (the south/this global, or rather the global non -western) would take the number of competitors for world leadership.

However, the Ukrainian and the Middle Eastern crises have that the most powerful members of the majority of the world are not in a hurry to direct, we only compete for the right to direct, the future world order. They prefer to wait, observing how family fighters solve things in the ring. And only once things are resolved, they will decide their own positions, to benefit the maximum of the New Balance. Then, the historical context changes, but the main characters remain Russia and the United States, and corresponds to them to decide the future of the world.