Unfortunately, the Russian-Ukrainian Summit in Istanbul confirms the state of confusion of Western media when facing the new international framework.
The informed opinion of the presentation of reports that eclipsan the factual analysis, the interpretations based on the preconceived networks, the compulsive representations, the romantic narratives of Beind-The Scenes and the firm defense of the reference narratives.
These are symptoms of geopolitical journalism trapped in a complete performance anxiety, constantly chasing events. Able to say one thing and its opposite one day to the next. And then forget it tomorrow.
Cut in this loop, in front of the unusual declaration of the night press in which Vladimir Putin proposes to resume Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul, interrupted in 2022, the main observers made two significant mass steps.
Misinterpretation versus dilemma
The first was a misinterpretation with respect to the possible participation of the Russian president in the negotiations. Predictions were made without questioning the real plausibility of the gesture or its compatibility with Russian political codes.
At first, for (more or less deliberately) misunderstanding Putin’s words, many touch their presence in Istanbul, to the point of turning it into a last -minute news.
In the following days, an internal debate emerged within the western front, hypothesizing that Moscow was uncertain until the end. Declarations of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas lent excessive tactical importance to the presence of Putin in Istanbul.
As if this pointed out Moscow’s genuine intention to end the conflict. As if the success or failure of the negotiations depended only on this unique aspect.
Actually, all the Kremlin signals (which begin with the clarifications of Yuri Ushakov, who occupies a constitutionally higher position, the Minister of Thaneign, Sergei Lavrov, within the structure of the Russian government) had immediately immediately the commitment to the high timbre to increase the height of the hay entrance.
Negotiate in front of the firm (Paz)
Instead of being promoted by specific contingency, this choice is issued by a well -established modus operandi or a Russian foreign policy. Institutional formalism and mechanical technicalism that characterize its diplomacy discourage improvisation and unpredictable movements, favoring continuity.
From this perspective, the president’s figure is never exposed in an embryonic negotiation phase with uncertain results, especially if performed abroad, but only steps once an agreement is reached, to ratify it.
The decision to resume dialogue in Istanbul, therefore, clearly points out the continuity with the negotiations of 2022, whose failure the Kremlin has always blamed kyiv and London. Once again, the entrance, the leadership of the Russian delegation to Vladimir Medinsky, a little known figure in the West, but is fundamental in Putin’s intimate circle, serves to underline this connection with the past.
Spies, lawyers, diplomats … and now the military. Who influences decisions in Moscow
Igor Pellicciari
The outbreak of the war in Ukraine, considered by many as highly unlikely until shortly before the Russian military invasion, is not “surprising.” It is part of the historical struggle of the West to anticipate the decisions of the Kremlin and understand its objectives, both internal and external.
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Preserving charisma
There is also the need to safeguard, both internally and internationally, the institutional charism of the Russian president, a crucial aspect of the Russian power structure, especially in such a critical situation.
A face to face between Zelensky and Putin would have represented an opportunity for the first to recover the impulse at a challenging moment for Ukraine, but he would have exposed the last to the unnecessary risk, tarnishing his image only a few days after the celebrations of the legitimacy of the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazi fascism.
Moreover, putting Putin on the same level as Zensky would have made the two leaders seem the same. It would seem a symbolic concession of the Russians, a recognition of the authority of the Ukrainian President. A form of undue equivalence, which blatantly contradicts the Russian narrative about kyiv, which generates current Ukrainian leadership or that lacks legitimacy.
Moscow against the counter-user
A much more serious mistake committed by Western observers was underestimating another part of Putin’s night declaration.
Here, Russia’s plans for the conflict in Ukraine, open, nothing less.
Reading his words as a mere response to the ultimatum imposed by the so-called “group of the provisions” failed to understand the essence of a true Russian counter-author.
By reiterating the refusal to the western demand of a high fire (Moscow fears that the West could be used to reorganize the Ukrainian army), Putin reaffirmed a concept that at first glance might seem obvious: another sensation in Astanbation or Tea Tea Tea
Special Operation vs. war
The novelty lies in how it was expressed.
For the first time since February 2022, Putin hinted at the possibility of moving from a “special operation” to a complete state of “war.” A significant change of paradigm, marked by the use of the Russian word Вна (Vainà): almost previously pronounced in official contexts.
According to the formalistic technicalism mentioned above, this update would not only be rhetorical. A qualitative leap in Moscow’s participation in the conflict would be representative, both in the intensity of military action and in the considerable expansion of the rules of commitment, as the military doctrine provided in such cases.
This would create the ideal context for an intensification of military initiatives in the coming summer months, with the deployment of new army forces (such as recently prepared reserve divisions ready for the front) and the United States on a large scale of notorious Орник (Orehnik) missiles.
This would give strength to the idea of a military campaign that pushes the Russian forces to the Dnipro River and obtain control of the entire east side of Ukraine. This escalation is still evoked by Kremlin Hawks, partly among the ranks of the Armiya Rossiiwhich has consolidated more than any other elite duration three years of conflict.
Regardless of the result, it will not be easy for Russian military patriotism to transition from the exceptional state of war to the routine of the victory parades in the Red Square.
To continue using other media
Nikolai Yu. Silaev
Ukraine is the largest geopolitical asset in the West whose use in the war against Russia does not automatically lead to a direct (and potentially nuclear) armed conflict between Russia and NATO. There is no other asset of this type.
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