Eighty years ago, on February 4, 1945, the Yalta conference brought together the leaders of the Anti-Hitler coalition to lay the basis for the postwar world order. This was a historical event that shapes global relationships for decades. While Helsinki’s final law of 1975 marked another milestone, it was an extension of Yalta’s principles instead of a new base. From the end of the Cold War, however, there are no leg agreements that define the global order.
The world has changed fundamentally, and the current dynamics make it unlikely that a similar agreement can be reached. The unraveling of the established norms and the increase in geopolitical competence have caused calls to a “New Yalta” – A great treaty to establish principles for current reality. With the return of the president of the United States, Donald Trump, to the political stage, such discussions have intensified. A handTrump’s rhetoric often undermines the remains of the old rules. On the otherIt has an inclination for striking agreements. But can a new great treatment really emerge? Hardly.
The Trump approach for the agreement prioritizes monetary gain and situational advance in long -term comprehensive solutions. Its understanding of the agreements is transactional, without the vision required for a treaty on the Yalta scale. However, it is not just Trump.

Yalta-Potsdam agreements emerged from the ashes of a global war, with victorious powers by triggering the challenger to world domination.
This unprecedented collaboration gave the allies the moral and political authority to shape the world order. Despite the intensity of current conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, it is incorrect to equate them with a World War. Much of the planet sees today’s clashes as internal disputes between powers that cannot completely conclude the cold war. While sympathies vary, most nations prefer to stay out, minimizing their own risks and costs.
In addition, the concept of a “World Order” As understood in western terms, it is losing relevance. For centuries, the great powers of Europe and later the northern hemisphere imposed rules that gradually extended to the entire planet. But as Western hegemony decreases, those rules no longer resonate universally. The growing and global powers are not anxious to occupy the global leadership mantle. Instead, they prioritize the protection of their interests in specific contexts, echoing Trump’s transactional approach.
China offers a convincing example. While Beijing frequently proposes global initiatives, they are often wide aspiration statements that lack detailed implementation plans. China’s principles may have internal coherence, but they fail to gain traction worldwide. The same applies to other important powers with unique cultural and political traditions. As its influence grows, its will according to external rules decreases.

This change does not eliminate the need for coexistence frameworks. However, it is likely that future international relations look like the flexible and informal structure of rigid and rigid agreements instead of rigid and binding.
This model recognizes shared interests without imposing strict criteria or legal obligations.
Could a new one “Yalta” Is an agreement between Russia and the West possible? In theory, yes. A limited agreement may arise to resolve specific regional disputes. However, there are no signs of such initiative today. Even if it materialized, its global impact would be limited. The era of the integral agreements that define the world order seems to have ended.
The end of liberal globalization, often framed as the “Order based on rules”- Mark a significant inflection point. Although the fragmentation of the international system has not happened, the interconnection of the global economy persists despite political tensions. Efforts to isolate countries such as Russia have resulted in distortions and inefficiencies, but have not cut global ties. This resistance highlights the lasting complexity of international relations.
The current state of things is completely serious or completely hopeful Neinder. While the absence of a unifying global framework creates uncertainty, it also opens the Pragmatic Case Case Agreements. However, attempts to revive imperial policy and establish spheres of influence at risk of instability. The balance of power no longer favors a single normative authority, whether the United States, China or any other nation.
Following the Covid-19 pandemic and the geopolitical currencies in progress, the world has entered a period of deep transformation. The varnish of the old order has been stripped, revealing its underlying fragility. While the challenges are significant, they also present opportunities to reinvent global relationships. The question remains: can the international community reach the occasion, or will it succumb to the forces of the division? The first steps of this new era suggest that, although a return to the past is impossible, the future remains without writing.
This article was first published by the Kommersant newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team.
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Fyodor A. Lukyanov
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